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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we describe ongoing work that 
focuses on improving the strength of the answers to 
security questions. The ultimate goal of the proposed 
research is to evaluate the possibility of nudging 
users towards strong answers for ubiquitous security 
questions. In this research we are proposing a user 
interface design for fallback authentication to 
encourage users to design stronger answers. The 
proposed design involves visual feedback to the user 
based on mnemonics which attempts to give visual 
feedback to the user on the strength of the answer 
provided and guide the user to creatively design a 
stronger answer.   
 
1. Introduction 
 
Fallback authentication is the backup, which 
approach a user takes to retrieve his/her account in 
case of loss of password [4]. Almost all sites, 
Google, Microsoft, and Facebook that involve user 
accounts have incorporated fallback authentication 
methods to facilitate users to regain their accounts in 
case user lose the password. Fallback authentication 
enables account regaining possible without forcing 
the user to go through customer assistance 
email/phone calls which was the case in the early 
stages of account recovery [3].  
 
Mechanisms of providing security in web are 
always a trade-off between security and usability 
[23]. This research evaluates the possibility of 
improving the security aspect of fallback 
authentication whilst keeping the usability aspect 
intact.  
 
Web based accounts are inevitably vulnerable to 
identity theft and a fallback authentication approach 
is required for convenient account recovery [3]. 
Fallback authentication mainly follows three 
common approaches, SMS based account recovery 
[10], verification email based account recovery and 
security question based account recovery [9]. 
Account recovery using a mobile device is attractive 
as it provides additional mobility aspect to the user. 
The most remarkable feature of the mobile 
environment is mobility of the device, mobility of 
the service as well as mobility of the user [16]. 
However, this mobility feature itself could oppose 
security; for example, SMS messages may fail if the 
user does not have access to their mobile telephones 
while travelling overseas. On the other hand, mobile 
telephones are not only prone to get stolen and lost 
but also frequently shared among family and peers. 
Both the first two methods lack usability aspect as it 
requires the use of a secondary account, personal 
mobile phone or personal email account for 
successful account recovery. In the case where the 
user loses access to all his/her personal information 
and lose access to his/her accounts this approach 
may not be a viable solution, as it depends on a 
secondary account to recover the primary account.  
 
The other approach utilized for fallback 
authentication is the security questions based account 
recovery mechanism [3]. It is commonly argued that 
fallback authentication should always involve 
personal information for account recovery, which 
need not to be memorized.  
 
This is on the basis that the answers given to 
security questions should be more memorable than 
the password [5] [6] [7]. Common examples being 
“mother’s maiden name”, “your favorite movie in 
childhood”. This type of questions are selected 
mainly due to the understanding of the user 
approaching the fallback authentication to reclaim 
their account when they have lost the original 
credentials. Therefore, the recovery approach needs 
to be knowledge based and not memory based [21]. 
These are called cognitive passwords. A cognitive 
password is a form of knowledge-based 
authentication that requires a user to answer a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
question, presumably something they intrinsically 
know, to verify their identity. Cognitive passwords 
have high memorability rates, but they are 
commonly used and are easily guessable [21].   
 
Security experts and phishing attackers are in a 
rat race today. On the one hand, security experts with 
the help of software designers and developers will 
continue to improve phishing and spam detection 
tools. Nevertheless, people are the weakest link in 
information security [11, 14, 25]. On the other hand, 
attackers will not hesitant to learn new techniques 
and change their strategies according to human 
defects to make a phishing attack successful [24, 25].  
To prevent this, phishing education needs to be 
considered [6, 15, 24, 25, 35, 36, 38, 39 and 52].   
 
2. Related Work 
 
In 1990, Zviran and Haga’s study showed that 
cognitive passwords, while being easily memorable 
are hard to guess, even for close friends [13]. Yet, 
having a method of authenticating purely based on 
one’s personal knowledge may reduce the security 
aspect, though it improves the usability. Best 
example being Republican vice presidential 
candidate Sarah Palin’s Yahoo! Email account being 
“hijacked” in the run-up to the 2008 US election [1]. 
The “hacker” simply used the password reset prompt 
and answered her security questions [2]. It is evident 
that the hacker in this case did not need any 
password hacking methods, other than mere social 
engineering knowledge to find out the victim’s 
personal information by searching their personal 
profile. 
 
Podd et al. [25] conducted a questionnaire survey 
study measuring participants’ recall and guessing 
rates of conventional, cognitive and word association 
passwords. The study employed 86 Massey 
University undergraduates. Participants completed a 
questionnaire covering all three password types, as 
well as returned after two weeks for a recall test. 
Each participant was also asked to nominate a 
“significant other” (e.g. parent, partner, etc.), who 
attempted to guess the participant’s answers. The 
study findings revealed that on average, cognitive 
items produced the highest recall rates (80%), 
however, the guessing rate was also significantly 
high (39.5%). Word associations produced 
significantly low guessing rates (7%), however, it 
has been shown that response words were poorly 
recollected (39%). Nevertheless, authors concluded 
that both cognitive items and word associations have 
a sufficient promise as password techniques (in this 
case recall and guessing) to warrant further 
investigation.  
Security aspect of Fallback authentication has 
been much researched upon [21]. Even though 
extensive research has been conducted in improving 
the security of password authentication [4], [5], [6], 
[7], and also in introducing novel techniques for 
fallback authentication [14], [21], adequate attention 
has not been paid to improve the usability and 
security aspects of the most commonly used fallback 
authentication technique for many web based 
accounts [4] [21] which is Security questions based 
fallback authentication process.  
 
The capability to verify the user identity when an 
account hijacking attempt has occurred is an integral 
part of the login risk analysis system [12]. Google 
researchers along with academics have revealed that 
current security questions are neither secure nor 
reliable enough to be used as a backup mechanism to 
reclaim a lost account [3]. Their argument was that 
security questions suffer from a fundamental flaw of 
usable security: the security questions and their 
answers are either somewhat secure or usable, but 
rarely both. They also stressed that security questions 
can still be useful when the risk level is considered 
low [3]. To design a better extra level of security, it 
is worth understanding the strength of the answers 
users provided for security questions.  
 
This paper attempts to introduce a set of 
guidelines to design an interface called “secret 
question meter”. The “secret question meter” 
interface provides visual feedback on the strength of 
answers given in security questions to nudge users 
towards stronger answers. The designed visual 
feedback to the user based on mnemonics attempted 
to nudge the user towards strong answers for their 
chosen security questions. The visual representation 
of answers’ strength to security questions is often 
presented as a colored bar on screen. Furthermore, 
our “secret question meter” interface provides 
suggestions to assist users in selecting strong security 
questions and their answers. 
 
We have integrated suggestions based on 
mnemonics for stronger answers if the user decides 
to go along with the weak answer irrespective of the 
feedback from the strength indicator. Mnemonics 
have been tested and proven to improve 
memorability on stronger passwords rather than 
random passwords with digits and special characters 
to improve strength [15]. All these mechanisms are 
not enforced on the user and work as suggestions 
where the user holds the final decision to set the 
answer they feel best. 
 
3. Proposed Design Guidelines 
 
We are proposing an interface design to walk the 
user through a process of setting up a stronger 
fallback authentication layer with an extra level of 
security. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
The proposed design involves five security 
questions, three pre-defined and selectable from a 
drop down list of questions, and two defined by the 
user. User selected security questions are proven to 
be more effective in fallback authentication 
configuration as user defined questions are harder to 
guess than the predefined questions that are 
ubiquitous. Google allows users to create their own 
security questions as a part of setting up their 
fallback authentication method [3]. Yet, depending 
solely on user created security questions may also 
introduce lower security level as users may select 
simpler questions [3]. 
 
Figure. 1. Security Question Interface. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure. 2. 
Strength 
Indicator Meter. (a) weak (b) medium strength (c) 
Strong 
 
On answering the questions, the proposed design 
provides the users with a feedback dialog which 
would give the user an idea of the strength of the 
answers they should provide, to have a secure answer 
adhering to five guidelines. According to Blase et al. 
[17] password strength meters with a variety of 
visual appearances lead users to create longer 
passwords. However, significant increases in 
resistance to a password-cracking algorithm were 
only achieved using meters that scored passwords 
that leads users to include more digits, symbols, and 
uppercase letters into their password. The proposed 
design involves a meter similar to the password 
strength meter to evaluate the strength of the answers 
given by the user. Many popular websites, from 
Google to Twitter, employ password meters [18]. 
These five guidelines are similar to the common 
parameters used in password strength indicators [17] 
which are proven to be effective. The design has an 
animated interface to enhance the visual appearance. 
It will dynamically display the strength of the answer 
the user type and will motivate the user towards a 
stronger, more secure answer [19]. The strength of 
the answer is measured by the following parameters. 
 
● Has at least one capital letter 
● Has at least one digit 
● Has at least one special character 
● Has at least one letter  
● At least eight characters long 
 
These animated interfaces would give the user an 
idea of the strength of the answer they have already 
set-up. It not only indicates the strength level of the 
answer provided with the parameters being displayed 
in the meter, but also contains a color bar that goes 
from red (weak), orange (strong) to green (very 
strong) to effectively indicate the strength of the 
word typed [19]. Yet, these guidelines and strength 
indicators are designed for password (which could be 
any random text) setup process, and may not suite 
the security question answers (which has a fixed 
answer). To adhere to the given guidelines users 
need to creatively design their answers.  
 
Mnemonics is an approach that could be used to 
generate strong yet memorable text phrases. Primal 
et al [15] proposes mnemonics to be used as a 
solution for memorable stronger passwords. 
Mnemonics uses personal memories and use them in 
their passwords/answers that allow the individual to 
more easily and efficiently recall certain personal 
experiences [20]. We have incorporated mnemonics 
to give hints to the user to creatively set up stronger 
answers that adheres to the parameters specified by 
the strength indicator meter via simple dialogs. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
If the user decides to proceed with a weak 
answer, i.e. the user neglects the strength indicator 
feedback and save a weak answer for a particular 
security question, we display a mnemonic based 
suggestion to the user to give him an idea how to set 
a stronger answer for a security question. This is 
similar to the passive aggressive password meter 
design by Tim Holman and Tobias van Schneider 
[24]. This approach is passive yet effective in coaxing 
the user towards a better answer. We have integrated 
the same concept to incorporate mnemonics in 
designing a stronger answer for the security 
questions. The dialog is phrased with simple text that 
encourages user towards a stronger answer for their 
security question which is both personal knowledge 
and not easily guessable. 
 
The dialog box provides sample answers for 
questions in the drop down list of the question 
selection interface. The suggestions are simple and 
straightforward, for example, 
  Question: What is your favorite sport? 
  Mnemonic based answer: CrickICC15@Aus. 
 
 
The dialog also carries an explanation educating 
the user how the mnemonic answer was composed. 
In the example provided the explanation would be, 
“My favorite sport is cricket, my favorite cricket 
team is Australia and they won the ICC world cup in 
2015”. Primal et al [15] emphasizes that mnemonic 
based words are both memorable and strong when 
combined with personal memories which has high 
recall rate. 
  
  
4. Conclusion and Future Work 
 
With this approach we hope to improve the 
current approach used in security question fallback 
authentication systems. As previously mentioned 
hacking an account by answering the security 
questions of the fallback authentication process does 
not require any special skill other than simple social 
engineering knowledge. Hence, the proposed design 
attempts to ensure that the answers given to security 
questions are not easily guessable for a third party 
individual to gain easy access to the user account. 
The proposed interface design is expected to improve 
the attention paid by user on the fallback 
authentication security question setup process. It 
educates the user on mnemonics based answer 
designing for better security with usability.  
 
We hope to conduct user survey with the use of 
the proposed interface to evaluate the impact of the 
interactive strength indicator and answer suggestion 
dialogs on the end user. Also we hope to improve the 
design depending on the feedback of the survey 
participants. 
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